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This case involves a ruling of the Court wherein the motion to suppress the blood test of the defendant on the ground that the court order and supporting affidavit are defective was denied.

A car accident occurred in Bayvile Avenue in the Incorporated Village of Bayville between two vehicles. The responding officer, who arrived at 2:22 A.M., noticed that the defendant was the driver of the overturned car and had some facial lacerations in the vicinity of the forehead and one of his cheeks. The other car was a red car who sustained severe damages in the front and passenger side which led to the wrongful death of one of the passengers. Drivers of both passengers were transported to the community hospital. Police officer arrived at 2:55 A.M. Upon inquiry, defendant said to the Police Officer that he was originally heading westbound on Bayville Avenue.” The Police Officer then asked the defendant, “are you sure you were westbound or eastbound?” and “were you headed toward your parents’ house or away from it?” The defendant “finally said that he was heading towards his parents’ house which was eastbound”.

While talking with the Brooklyn defendant, the Police Officer noticed an odor of alcoholic beverages on defendant’s breath. He described the odor as moderate level which wasn’t overly strong but it was noticeable even the officer was two feet away during the conversation. The Police Officer told the defendant that he is being placed under arrest for suspicion of driving while intoxicated. At 3:50 A.m., the Police Officer asked the defendant to submit himself to a chemical analysis of his breath. The defendant consulted his lawyer and thereafter refused to take the test. Following the refusal, which was about 4:20 A.M., efforts were made to get a court order. At approximately 5:30 A.M., a court order had been obtained and blood was taken from the defendant at 5:50 A.M.

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This case was brought about by a car accident involving a Pontiac automobile which crashed into the living room of the house of the plaintiff-decedent after being pursued by members of the Suffolk County Police Department. The vehicle was owned by defendant-corporation, which rented the car to defendant-lessee, who alleged that defendant-perpetrator took possession of the subject vehicle without her knowledge or consent.

Defendant-corporation sought the dismissal of the complaint and alleged that it is the owner of the subject vehicle, as well as a company in the business of renting automobiles and is therefore insulated from liability by operation of the “Graves Amendment” as codified at 42 USCA §30106 and which is a part of the Federal Transportation Equity Act. Hence, all claims asserted against defendant-corporation must be dismissed as a matter of law.

Defendant-corporation’s Senior Loss Control Administrator stated that in December of 2006, it was the owner of the 2006 Pontiac automobile bearing the license plate CWJ197. He further states that on December 20, 2006, said vehicle was rented to defendant-lessee. The two affidavits authored by defendant-lessee revealed that she was not the owner of the 2006 Pontiac automobile but rather rented same on December 20, 2006 from defendant-corporation and that defendant-perpetrator operated the subject automobile without her knowledge, permission or consent.

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This case is about a defendant-corporation seeking the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) by reason of the Graves Amendment; and the plaintiff seeking leave of court to amend the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) in order to avoid dismissal on that ground.

Plaintiff alleged that on April 29, 2006, she sustained serious personal injuries as a result of a collision between her vehicle and a vehicle owned by defendant-corporation and operated by defendant-driver. She further alleged that defendant-driver was an employee of defendant-corporation, and was operating the vehicle “under the course of his employment,” and “with the express knowledge, consent and/or on the business” of defendant-corporation. The collision was allegedly caused by “the defendants’ negligence, carelessness and recklessness”.

A Federal statue, known as the Graves Amendment “bars vicarious liability actions against professional lessors and renters of vehicles,” as would otherwise be permitted by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. “Vicarious liability laws caused lessors to either cease leasing cars in states having them, opting for more expensive balloon note structures, or spread the cost of higher insurance premiums to lease customers nationwide.”

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This case is about a car accident which occurred in a slippery road due to the presence of snow and ice. Plaintiff wanted to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained due to the negligence of the defendants when the vehicle of the latter struck her. The County Of Suffolk, Suffolk County Department of Public Works, and the Suffolk County Police Department, were also included as defendants because they failed, inter alia, to keep and maintain Vanderbilt Parkway clear and free of accumulating ice, failed to spread salt, sand or other substances; failed to inspect the roadway where water and ice would remain, and failed to warn of the condition. In addition, plaintiff alleged that defendant County of Suffolk had actual notice of the subject icy, hazardous condition and failed to timely and properly act thus breaching its duty to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition.

The County of Suffolk sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it on the basis that the County was afforded no prior written notice of the alleged defective or dangerous roadway so as to comply with the mandates of Suffolk County Charter C8-2A as a condition precedent to this action; and that the Suffolk County Police Department owed no special duty to the plaintiffs.

The evidence indicates that at the time of the car accident there was a slippery, snowy, icy area in the vicinity of Commack Middle School on Vanderbilt Parkway. The Police Officer responding to the scene testified that prior to the accidents on Vanderbilt Parkway he called in by radio to the police department to have the County send out a truck to sand the area where the accident occurred due to the snow and ice on the roadway. A Brooklyn employee of the Suffolk County Department of Public Works Highway Engineering Division testified that she did not receive any calls concerning snow or ice conditions on Vanderbilt Parkway, and yet she said that the County trucks either plowed, sanded or salted the subject roadway on January 27, 2003 without specifying the specific time it was done, the location of the work, or how the County determined that such work was indicated.

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This case is about a car accident involving three vehicles that happened at the intersection of Hempstead Turnpike and Silver Lane in Levittown. The defendants were indicted and charged with manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide on alternative theories of individual and accomplice liability.

The accident happened on January 31, 1983, around 11:00 P.M. wherein the Chevrolet Nova of the victim, which was turning left from the westbound turning lane of Hempstead Turnpike across the eastbound lanes thereof into Silver Lane, was struck by two cars rapidly approaching in the eastbound lanes of the Hempstead Turnpike. The Staten island car in the eastbound center lane, a blue Pontiac Trans Am, separated from the collision, skidded to the south curb and flipped over. The car in the eastbound left lane, a red Camaro, dragged the Nova further east down Hempstead Turnpike until they both came to a stop near the south curb. The Queens driver of the Chevrolet Nova died instantly from skull fractures and intracranial hemorrhage. The defendant-driver of the blue Trans Am was removed unconscious from his car with trauma injuries. The defendant-driver of the Camaro and his passenger sustained only minor cuts.

The prosecution introduced at trial the defendant-driver of the Camaro and moved that the case be tried before two juries, one for each defendant. The trial court granted the said motion and impaneled two juries. The members of each jury were given labels to wear designating which defendant’s fate they were considering. They were instructed by the trial court not to communicate with the members of the other defendant’s jury, and not to speculate about the reason for the presence in the courtroom at times of only one of the two juries. Opening statements were made to each jury separately and then both juries were brought into the courtroom to hear the testimony. During the introduction of the inculpatory statements of the defendant-diver Camaro, only his jury remained in the courtroom while the other defendant’s jury was excluded. Separate summations were delivered to each jury and, without objection, the court gave one charge to both juries, omitting any mention of the inculpatory statements.

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A doctor and his wife from Manhattan, riding in their Jeep were stopped at an intersection where they were in line to turn left. As they were waiting for the light, a police car came from the opposite direction. It was travelling at a high speed and when it reached the intersection, the police car skidded and started spinning.

It was the doctor’s wife who first saw the spinning police car. By the time they saw the spinning police car, it was too late to get out of its way. The police car hit the doctor’s Jeep on its left front side. The police car hit the Jeep with such force and momentum that the Jeep started spinning.

The doctor and his wife sustained injuries for which they were hospitalized and rendered unable to work. The police officer who was driving the police car was also injured. He did not have any memory of the car accident because of the head trauma which he suffered.

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A man drove to the house of a friend whom he was supposed to pick up. When he got to his friend’s house, he left the car engine running with the key in the ignition to ring the doorbell and alert his friend that he had already arrived to pick him up. While he was in the house, a man stole the car that was parked in the driveway. The thief took the car and drove off at such a high speed.

In the meantime another man was stopped at an intersection. He was waiting for the light to turn green so that he can make a left turn. As he was waiting for the traffic signal, the thief was driving from the same direction at such a high speed. The thief lost control of the He car and hit the car that was stopped at the intersection.

The impact of the stolen car hitting the stopped car was so great that the driver of the parked car lost consciousness while still inside his car. When the parked car was struck from behind by the stolen car, the parked car also careened off and hit another car.

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The action for damages stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an automobile accidentoccurred at westbound Jericho Turnpike approximately fifty (50) feet east of Wellington Road, in the County of Nassau, Town of North Hempstead, New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2004 Honda operated by plaintiff and a 2004 Jeep owned and operated by defendant.

A Lawyer said that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff’s vehicle was traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Defendant’s vehicle was also traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Plaintiff contends that her vehicle was stopped in traffic in the left lane on Jericho Turnpike when the defendant’s vehicle struck her from behind, pushing her car forward approximately one car length. Plaintiff further contends that, as a result of the heavy impact, her body was caused to move forward and backward in her vehicle and said impact caused her neck and back to strike the headrest and seat. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that she sustained the following injuries:

Posterior disc bulges at C3-C4, C-4-C-5 and C6-C7 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal; Small joint effusion of the left knee; Menisci and ligament/ right knee; Posterior disc herniations at the L5-S1 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal and abutting the nerve roots bilaterally; Decreased range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine; Decreased range of motion of the left knee; Left knee pain/sprain; Cervicalgia; Lumbar disc herniation at L5-S1; Pain in the limbs; Neuropathy; Cervical sprain and strain; Lumbar sprain and strain; Lumbargo; Weakness in muscles.

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A complainant woman commenced an action for her claimed of personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident.

According to the woman’s statement, after the car accident the police responded to the scene but an ambulance did not arrive. The Queens woman then exited her vehicle unassisted, without any pain in any part of her body and was capable of driving her vehicle from the scene to her workplace. The woman testified that she first sought medical attention when she felt some pain in her lower back and headaches. X-ray examinations were taken and chiropractic treatment was rendered by a physician. She further testified that she was treated by the same physician regularly until the winter and eventually discontinued the treatment. Thereafter, she received physical therapy two or three times per week for a few months. She also testified that she visited an orthopedist on three or four occasions.

The woman no longer receives medical treatment for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the accident, nor does have any future medical appointments scheduled. She testified that she was confined to her bed for one day as a result of the accident and missed less than one week of work. The court notes that the testimony contradicts the woman’s bill of particulars.

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On June 10, 2007, a woman, driving a Nissan was rear-ended by a BMW as it was stopped at the intersection of Merrick Road and East Shore Drive in Nassau. As a result of this car accident the woman sustained a spinal injury: she had swollen discs and a severe sprain of the lumbar spine. She asserts that two weeks after the accident occurred, she was ordered to rest in bed by her doctor. She was also confined to her home and could not go to work until after another four weeks.

She claims that after the car accident, she could no longer play volleyball or do gardening. She cannot stand or sit for more than thirty minutes. Fifteen months after the accident, the woman joined a local gym where her favourite workout was on the recumbent bicycle.

The defendant owner and driver of the BMW that allegedly rear-ended her Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment. He claims that the complaint should be dismissed because the woman failed to state that the spinal injury she sustained is a serious injury. She also failed to state which classification of serious injury she falls under. There are five categories of serious injury under the Insurance Law: death, dismemberment, significant disfigurement, fracture or loss of a fetus, total loss of use of a body organ, function or system.

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