Articles Posted in Distracted Driving

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This case is about a defendant-corporation seeking the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) by reason of the Graves Amendment; and the plaintiff seeking leave of court to amend the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) in order to avoid dismissal on that ground.

Plaintiff alleged that on April 29, 2006, she sustained serious personal injuries as a result of a collision between her vehicle and a vehicle owned by defendant-corporation and operated by defendant-driver. She further alleged that defendant-driver was an employee of defendant-corporation, and was operating the vehicle “under the course of his employment,” and “with the express knowledge, consent and/or on the business” of defendant-corporation. The collision was allegedly caused by “the defendants’ negligence, carelessness and recklessness”.

A Federal statue, known as the Graves Amendment “bars vicarious liability actions against professional lessors and renters of vehicles,” as would otherwise be permitted by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. “Vicarious liability laws caused lessors to either cease leasing cars in states having them, opting for more expensive balloon note structures, or spread the cost of higher insurance premiums to lease customers nationwide.”

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This case is about a car accident which occurred in a slippery road due to the presence of snow and ice. Plaintiff wanted to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained due to the negligence of the defendants when the vehicle of the latter struck her. The County Of Suffolk, Suffolk County Department of Public Works, and the Suffolk County Police Department, were also included as defendants because they failed, inter alia, to keep and maintain Vanderbilt Parkway clear and free of accumulating ice, failed to spread salt, sand or other substances; failed to inspect the roadway where water and ice would remain, and failed to warn of the condition. In addition, plaintiff alleged that defendant County of Suffolk had actual notice of the subject icy, hazardous condition and failed to timely and properly act thus breaching its duty to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition.

The County of Suffolk sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it on the basis that the County was afforded no prior written notice of the alleged defective or dangerous roadway so as to comply with the mandates of Suffolk County Charter C8-2A as a condition precedent to this action; and that the Suffolk County Police Department owed no special duty to the plaintiffs.

The evidence indicates that at the time of the car accident there was a slippery, snowy, icy area in the vicinity of Commack Middle School on Vanderbilt Parkway. The Police Officer responding to the scene testified that prior to the accidents on Vanderbilt Parkway he called in by radio to the police department to have the County send out a truck to sand the area where the accident occurred due to the snow and ice on the roadway. A Brooklyn employee of the Suffolk County Department of Public Works Highway Engineering Division testified that she did not receive any calls concerning snow or ice conditions on Vanderbilt Parkway, and yet she said that the County trucks either plowed, sanded or salted the subject roadway on January 27, 2003 without specifying the specific time it was done, the location of the work, or how the County determined that such work was indicated.

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This case is about a car accident involving three vehicles that happened at the intersection of Hempstead Turnpike and Silver Lane in Levittown. The defendants were indicted and charged with manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide on alternative theories of individual and accomplice liability.

The accident happened on January 31, 1983, around 11:00 P.M. wherein the Chevrolet Nova of the victim, which was turning left from the westbound turning lane of Hempstead Turnpike across the eastbound lanes thereof into Silver Lane, was struck by two cars rapidly approaching in the eastbound lanes of the Hempstead Turnpike. The Staten island car in the eastbound center lane, a blue Pontiac Trans Am, separated from the collision, skidded to the south curb and flipped over. The car in the eastbound left lane, a red Camaro, dragged the Nova further east down Hempstead Turnpike until they both came to a stop near the south curb. The Queens driver of the Chevrolet Nova died instantly from skull fractures and intracranial hemorrhage. The defendant-driver of the blue Trans Am was removed unconscious from his car with trauma injuries. The defendant-driver of the Camaro and his passenger sustained only minor cuts.

The prosecution introduced at trial the defendant-driver of the Camaro and moved that the case be tried before two juries, one for each defendant. The trial court granted the said motion and impaneled two juries. The members of each jury were given labels to wear designating which defendant’s fate they were considering. They were instructed by the trial court not to communicate with the members of the other defendant’s jury, and not to speculate about the reason for the presence in the courtroom at times of only one of the two juries. Opening statements were made to each jury separately and then both juries were brought into the courtroom to hear the testimony. During the introduction of the inculpatory statements of the defendant-diver Camaro, only his jury remained in the courtroom while the other defendant’s jury was excluded. Separate summations were delivered to each jury and, without objection, the court gave one charge to both juries, omitting any mention of the inculpatory statements.

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A doctor and his wife from Manhattan, riding in their Jeep were stopped at an intersection where they were in line to turn left. As they were waiting for the light, a police car came from the opposite direction. It was travelling at a high speed and when it reached the intersection, the police car skidded and started spinning.

It was the doctor’s wife who first saw the spinning police car. By the time they saw the spinning police car, it was too late to get out of its way. The police car hit the doctor’s Jeep on its left front side. The police car hit the Jeep with such force and momentum that the Jeep started spinning.

The doctor and his wife sustained injuries for which they were hospitalized and rendered unable to work. The police officer who was driving the police car was also injured. He did not have any memory of the car accident because of the head trauma which he suffered.

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A man drove to the house of a friend whom he was supposed to pick up. When he got to his friend’s house, he left the car engine running with the key in the ignition to ring the doorbell and alert his friend that he had already arrived to pick him up. While he was in the house, a man stole the car that was parked in the driveway. The thief took the car and drove off at such a high speed.

In the meantime another man was stopped at an intersection. He was waiting for the light to turn green so that he can make a left turn. As he was waiting for the traffic signal, the thief was driving from the same direction at such a high speed. The thief lost control of the He car and hit the car that was stopped at the intersection.

The impact of the stolen car hitting the stopped car was so great that the driver of the parked car lost consciousness while still inside his car. When the parked car was struck from behind by the stolen car, the parked car also careened off and hit another car.

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The action for damages stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an automobile accidentoccurred at westbound Jericho Turnpike approximately fifty (50) feet east of Wellington Road, in the County of Nassau, Town of North Hempstead, New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2004 Honda operated by plaintiff and a 2004 Jeep owned and operated by defendant.

A Lawyer said that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff’s vehicle was traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Defendant’s vehicle was also traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Plaintiff contends that her vehicle was stopped in traffic in the left lane on Jericho Turnpike when the defendant’s vehicle struck her from behind, pushing her car forward approximately one car length. Plaintiff further contends that, as a result of the heavy impact, her body was caused to move forward and backward in her vehicle and said impact caused her neck and back to strike the headrest and seat. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that she sustained the following injuries:

Posterior disc bulges at C3-C4, C-4-C-5 and C6-C7 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal; Small joint effusion of the left knee; Menisci and ligament/ right knee; Posterior disc herniations at the L5-S1 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal and abutting the nerve roots bilaterally; Decreased range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine; Decreased range of motion of the left knee; Left knee pain/sprain; Cervicalgia; Lumbar disc herniation at L5-S1; Pain in the limbs; Neuropathy; Cervical sprain and strain; Lumbar sprain and strain; Lumbargo; Weakness in muscles.

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This involves a case where the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to prove that the latter suffered serious injury threshold requirement of Insurance Law Sec. 5102 (d).

Plaintiff alleged that a car accident occurred on September 15, 2002 at approximately 5:15 p.m. at the intersection of Carman Avenue and Choir Lane in the Town of Hempstead, Long Island. Plaintiff claimed that as a result thereof, she suffered serious injuries. At her oral examination before trial, the Plaintiff testified that she had a preexisting spinal injury to her lower back from another car accident in 1988. After being treated for the injuries from that accident, the Plaintiff continued treating with a chiropractor for occasional discomfort to her back, “as needed,” rather than having a set schedule of appointments. Following the subject accident, it was suggested by multiple doctors that the Plaintiff undergo surgery and/or physical therapy, but she declined and chose to continue seeing the chiropractor instead. The Plaintiff also declined pain medication immediately following the accident, preferring over the counter medication. But plaintiff admitted she had her first doctor visit for medical expert opinion after 18 months from the accident. Following the accident, Plaintiff testified to having trouble bending over, walking long distances, participating in her children’s activities, dancing, hiking and brushing her teeth. Plaintiff claimed that she had some occasional discomfort in her back prior to the subject accident, and that the accident exacerbated that pain into a chronic condition.

The Court held that Plaintiff’s claims that her injuries satisfy the 90/180 category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) are unsupported and contradicted by her own testimony wherein she states that she only missed a week and a half of work and was confined to her home or bed for one week. Additionally, the Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that she was “medically” impaired from doing any daily activities as a result of this accident for 90 days within the first 180 days following the subject accident.

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This involves a case wherein the Court ruled that plaintiff’s injuries did not suffer a “serious injury” in the accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law which led for an order granting defendant summary judgment.

Plaintiff commenced the action against defendant allegedly for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a car accident with defendant which occurred on November 20, 2009, at approximately 7:51 p.m., at or near the intersection of Guinea Woods Road and Jericho Turnpike, Old Westbury, County of Nassau, State of New York. The accident involved a 2008 Chrysler owned and operated by plaintiff and a 2003 Volkswagen owned and operated by defendant. It is plaintiff’s contention that the car accident occurred when defendant’s vehicle struck plaintiff’s vehicle in the aforementioned intersection when, defendant’s vehicle, while speeding, made a left turn in the intersection and failed to yield the right of way.

Defendant argued that plaintiff’s medical records establish that plaintiff had a preexisting medical history of lower back pain that pre-dates and is unrelated to the subject accident. Defendant submits that, on January 22, 2004, almost six years prior to the subject accident, plaintiff went to a physician with complaints of back pain from the proceeding year and admitted that the condition originated five to six years earlier. Defendant added that the medical records of plaintiff’s treating physician, further showed that plaintiff had pre-existing spinal injury, lumbar stenosis and pain of his lumbar spine for which he was treating from 2004 through 2006 and again in 2009 prior to the subject car accident.

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This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident in 2008 within a private parking lot on route 107, near its intersection with Lewis Street, in the town of Oyster Bay, Nassau County, New York. In his bill of particulars, plaintiff alleges that he sustained the following spinal injury and other injuries which are alleged to be permanent: Cervical muscle spasm, cervical radiculopathy, neck pain with upper extremity weakness, lumbar radiculopathy, right and left shoulder pains with numbness and tingling decreased range of motion of the cervical spine, low back pain with lower extremity weakness, subluxation of the cervical spine and lumbar spine, headaches, muscle spasm of the lumbar spine, decreased range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine, mid back pain, dizziness, inability to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time, difficulty performing everyday activities such as bending, lifting, and sitting, necessity for prescribed pain medications, necessity for physical therapy, sleep disturbances, cervical spine tenderness with restricted range of motion, lumbrosacral spine tenderness with restricted range of motion, necessity for extended physical therapy, unable to perform household chores, loss of enjoy of life.

A source said that, plaintiff was involved in a prior motor vehicle accident in 2002 whereby he injured his neck, lower back, and shoulders. Defendant claims that the spinal injuries plaintiff complains of in this accident are not causally related to the 2008 motor vehicle accident, but rather are permanent spine injuries resulting from the 2002 accident.

Defendant has presented objective medical testing from 2002 in order to establish the preexisting spine injuries at the time of the 2008 accident. The MRI report dated February 25, 2002 of Dr. Richard J. Rizzuti indicated posterior disc bulge at L3-L4 and at L5-S1 impinging on the spinal canal. The report indicated posterior disc bulges at C-5-6 and at C6-7 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal. Therefore, plaintiff had bulging discs with impingement six years prior to the subject accident. Dr. Spindler states that “any scores falling in the abnormal range recognize a possible entrapment of the nerves and indicate that a problem exists.” More recently, plaintiff’s treating chiropractor, issued a report dated March 16, 2010 in which she opined that plaintiff suffered a permanent consequential disability with regard to his cervical and lumbar spine and is unable to perform his normal activities of daily living as a result of the 2002 accident. Defendant claims that the evidence demonstrates that any permanent and consequential spine injuries and plaintiff’s inability to perform activities of daily living were a result of the prior accident in August 2002 and not the subject accident.

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The above entitled action stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of an automobile accident with defendant occurred on May 16, 2008, when plaintiffs’ vehicle was exiting Northern State Parkway to Route 110 in Melville, County of Suffolk, State of New York. Plaintiff was operating a 2003 Lincoln Town Car which was owned by his employer Executive Limo. Defendant was the owner and operator of a 2001 Chevrolet. It is alleged that the automobile that was being driven by plaintiff was struck in the rear by the automobile being driven by defendant. Defendant claims that the impact was heavy and caused his glasses to fly off and his body to move back and forth inside the vehicle despite the fact that he was seat belted.

A Suffolk Lawyer said that, as a result of the accident plaintiff claims that he sustained the following injuries: Sprain of the anterior cruciate ligament/left knee; Tear in the posterior horn of the medial meniscus of the left knee and may require future surgery; Acromion impingement on the supraspinatous muscle of the left shoulder which may require future surgery; Increased signal in the supraspinatous tendon consistent with tendonopathy/left shoulder; Subligamentous posterior disc herniations at C3-4, C4-5, C5-6 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal at C3-4 and C4-5 and on the anterior aspect of the spinal cord at C5-6; Subligamentous posterior disc herniations of the lumbosacral spine at L4-5 and L5-S1 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal, the neural foramina bilaterally and left nerve root at L4-5; Moderate to sever stenosis from L3-L5; Cervical, thoracic and lumbar myofascitis; Lumbar and cervical radiculitis/radiculopathy; Left bicepital tendonitis; Left shoulder derangement; Left knee derangement; Left ankle sprain/strain; Left foot contusion and left plantar fascitis; Cervical sprain/strain; Thoracic sprain/strain; Lumbar sprain/strain; Cervical acceleration/deceleration injury; Myofascitis; Bilateral ulnar motor neuropathy at elbows; Borderline left median motor neuropathy; Right, distal medial sensory neuropathy; Bilateral ulnar sensory neuropathy; Left rotator cuff sprain; Decreased range of motion of the cervical spine; Decreased range of motion of the left shoulder; Myofascitis of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine; Left supraspinatus tendinopathy and impingement.

Plaintiff commenced the action with service of a Summons and Verified Complaint. Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and Article 51 of the Insurance Law of the State of New York, for an order granting her summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a “serious injury” in the subject accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d). Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion.

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