Articles Posted in Suffolk County

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This is an action to recover damages for serious personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Route 109 at or near the overpass of the Southern State Parkway, County of Suffolk, New York on March 9, 2005. Plaintiff claims in his complaint that he sustained serious permanent injuries as defined in Section 5102 (d) of the Insurance Law and economic loss greater than basic economic loss, as defined in Section 5102 (a) of the Insurance Law. A Lawyer said that, defendants now move for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting them summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff did not sustain a “serious injury” as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Plaintiff cross moves for partial summary judgment on liability grounds and for an inquest as to the assessment of damages. Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion, and defendants have filed a reply.

A source said that, in support of this motion defendants submit, the pleadings; the plaintiff’s verified bill of particulars; plaintiff’s Hospital emergency department records, including x-ray reports of plaintiff’s cervical and thoracic spine; the affirmed report of defendant’s examining neurologist,; the affirmed report of defendant’s examining radiologist,; the affirmed report of defendant’s examining orthopedist,; plaintiff’s employment verification records dated March 1, 2006; and plaintiff’s deposition testimony.

A Spine Injury Lawyer said that, plaintiff claims in his verified bill of particulars that he sustained, among other things, disc bulges of the cervical spine injury and ventral cord abutment; a limited range of motion of the cervical spine injury; weakness in the upper extremities; and lumbar radicular dysfunction. Plaintiff also claims that he sustained scarring, anxiety and mental suffering. Additionally, plaintiff claims that he was totally disabled for about three weeks and that he remains partially disabled to date. Lastly, plaintiff claims that he sustained a serious injury in the categories of a permanent loss of use, a permanent consequential limitation, a significant limitation and a non-permanent injury.

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This action is for personal injuries alleged to have occurred as a result of a motor vehicle accidentinvolving vehicles driven by plaintiff, , and defendant, , on February 19, 2002, at the intersection of Deepdale Drive and New York Avenue, Town of Huntington, New York. A Suffolk reporter said that, plaintiff served a summons and complaint on defendant. Thereafter, defendant served a third-party summons and complaint on third-party defendant. Within the third-party complaint, defendant alleged that the traffic light at the subject intersection was malfunctioning and inoperable at the time of the car accident.

A doctor said that, by order dated April 1, 2005, the third-party defendant was granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against it. Within the aforementioned Order, the Court noted that during the discovery process, it was revealed that the town, not the County of Suffolk, “owned operated and controlled” the traffic signal at the subject intersection. A Lawyer said that, by Order dated March 23, 2007, this Court granted the summary judgment motions of second third-party defendant, and third-party defendant, on the grounds that there was no issue of material fact regarding the liability of those defendants. Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff has not met the serious injury threshold as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant has submitted, among other things, the deposition transcript of plaintiff, and reports from two doctors who conducted independent medical examinations of plaintiff.

A Lawyer said that, plaintiff served a verified bill of particulars, sworn to on December 11, 2003, which alleged that she suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident: sprain and contusion of left hip; pain in left hip; pain in left wrist; and injuries to the cervical spine, including spinal nerve root compression and bulging discs. Each injury, except for superficial ones, was alleged to be permanent and/or long lasting, and caused diminution of use and motion of the neck and back. Plaintiff appeared for a deposition, and was thereafter physically examined, on or about October 25, 2006, by an orthopedist, and a neurologist, both of whom were designated by defendant. After conducting objective tests on plaintiff, the doctors found, as indicated by their sworn reports, that plaintiff had no orthopedic impairment and no neurologic injury. The orthopedist found that plaintiff may perform the daily activities of living, without restriction, and the neurologist found no permanency or disability as a result of the subject accident. Based upon these findings, a source said that defendant argues that plaintiff has not satisfied the “serious injury” threshold, as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). Defendant contends that plaintiff’s alleged soft tissue spinal injuries do not constitute a serious injury.

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This action was instituted by the plaintiff for alleged personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident occurring on January 27, 2003 at approximately 12.21 a.m. on Barton Avenue at or near its intersection with Valley Road in Patchogue, Suffolk County on Long Island, New York. A source said that, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant taxi company, being driven by co-defendant, attempted to make a left turn from Barton Avenue, eastbound, onto Valley Road without signaling and came into contact with the plaintiff’s vehicle which was proceeding straight on Barton Avenue in a westerly direction. The plaintiff claims she hit the steering wheel and was bleeding from her left knee. This lawsuit thereafter ensued.

A Lawyer said that, the defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §3212 dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff has not sustained a “serious physical injury” as that term is defined in Insurance Law §5102(d). The defendants submit medical proof to substantiate their claim that the plaintiff failed to sustain a “serious injury” in the car accident. The plaintiff opposes the requested relief in an attorney’s affirmation arid submission of the plaintiff’s deposition but proffers no medical proof to substantiate the claim of a “serious physical injury”.The issue in this case is whether plaintiff sustained serious personal injury as defined under the Insurance Law.

The function of the Court on a motion for summary judgment is issue finding not issue determination. It is a most drastic remedy which should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue or where the issue is even arguable. To grant summary judgment it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of fact is presented. This drastic remedy should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of such issues, or where the issue is `arguable; `issue finding, rather than issue determination is the key to the procedure.

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This action stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of a car accident with defendant which occurred on May 30, 2008, at approximately 7:35 a.m., at or near the intersection of Old Country Road and Sweet Hollow Road, Huntington, County of Suffolk, State of New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2005 Mitsubishi truck operated by plaintiff and owned by his employer,and a 2006 Chevrolet owned and operated by defendant.

Plaintiff contends that his vehicle was stopped for a red traffic signal at the aforementioned intersection and, when said traffic signal turned green for vehicles traveling eastbound through the intersection, plaintiff proceeded through said intersection. As plaintiff was driving through the intersection, defendant went through a red traffic light at the intersection and his vehicle collided with plaintiffs vehicle. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that he sustained serious injury.

Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and Article 51 of the Insurance Law of the State of New York, for an order granting him summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury” in the subject accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d). Plaintiff opposes the motion.

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This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff wife as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on the westbound Long Island Expressway, approximately 500 feet west of South Oyster Bay Road, in the County of Nassau. New York on May 13. 2008. The accident allegedly occurred when the vehicle operated by defendant and owned by the other defendant struck the rear of the vehicle operated by plaintiff husband while it was stopped in traffic. Plaintiff at the time of the accident was a front seat passenger in the vehicle operated by her husband,. By her bill of particulars, plaintiff alleges that she sustained various personal injuries as a result of the subject accident, including straightening of the cervical and lumbar curvature; disc bulges at levels C3 through C6 and level L4-L5; vertebral subluxation complex; and derangement of the left shoulder. Plaintiff alleges that she was confined to her bed and home for approximately two days immediately after the accident. Plaintiff further alleges that she was totally incapacitated from her employment as a registered nurse at the Hospital for approximately three days following the car accident and continues to be partially incapacitated from her employment to date.

A report said that, defendants now move for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs alleged spinal injuries do not meet the “serious injury” threshold requirement of Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support of the motion, defendants submit a copy of the pleadings, plaintiffs’ deposition transcript, and the sworn medical reports of the doctors. At defendants’ request, a neurologist, a chiropractor, and a physiatrist licensed in medical acupuncture, conducted independent examinations of plaintiff on September 23, 2008. A Lawyer said that, plaintiff opposes the instant motion on the ground that defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that her injuries do not come within the meaning of the serious injury threshold requirement of Insurance Law § 5102(d). Alternatively, plaintiff asserts that she sustained spinal injuries within the “limitation of use” and the “90/180 days” categories of serious injury as a result of the accident. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submits her own affidavit, the affidavit of her treating chiropractor, , and the sworn medical reports of her doctors.

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff sustained serious injury as defined under the Insurance Law.

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This action stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of a car accidentwith defendant which occurred on May 30, 2008, at approximately 7:35 a.m., at or near the intersection of Old Country Road and Sweet Hollow Road, Huntington, County of Suffolk, State of New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2005 Mitsubishi truck operated by plaintiff and owned by his employer,and a 2006 Chevrolet owned and operated by defendant.

Plaintiff contends that his vehicle was stopped for a red traffic signal at the aforementioned intersection and, when said traffic signal turned green for vehicles traveling eastbound through the intersection, plaintiff proceeded through said intersection. As plaintiff was driving through the intersection, defendant went through a red traffic light at the intersection and his vehicle collided with plaintiffs vehicle. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that he sustained serious injury.

Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and Article 51 of the Insurance Law of the State of New York, for an order granting him summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury” in the subject accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d). Plaintiff opposes the motion.

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This action is for personal injuries alleged to have occurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving vehicles driven by plaintiff, , and defendant, , on February 19, 2002, at the intersection of Deepdale Drive and New York Avenue, Town of Huntington, New York. A Personal Injury Lawyer said that, plaintiff served a summons and complaint on defendant. Thereafter, defendant served a third-party summons and complaint on third-party defendant. Within the third-party complaint, defendant alleged that the traffic light at the subject intersection was malfunctioning and inoperable at the time of the accident.

A Lawyer said that, by order dated April 1, 2005, the third-party defendant was granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against it. Within the aforementioned Order, the Court noted that during the discovery process, it was revealed that the town, not the County of Suffolk, “owned operated and controlled” the traffic signal at the subject intersection. A Suffolk Personal Injury Lawyer said that, by Order dated March 23, 2007, this Court granted the summary judgment motions of second third-party defendant, and third-party defendant, on the grounds that there was no issue of material fact regarding the liability of those defendants. Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff has not met the serious injury threshold as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant has submitted, among other things, the deposition transcript of plaintiff, and reports from two doctors who conducted independent medical examinations of plaintiff.

A source said that, plaintiff served a verified bill of particulars, sworn to on December 11, 2003, which alleged that she suffered the following injuries as a result of the car accident: sprain and contusion of left hip; pain in left hip; pain in left wrist; and injuries to the cervical spine, including spinal nerve root compression and bulging discs. Each injury, except for superficial ones, was alleged to be permanent and/or long lasting, and caused diminution of use and motion of the neck and back. Plaintiff appeared for a deposition, and was thereafter physically examined, on or about October 25, 2006, by an orthopedist, and a neurologist, both of whom were designated by defendant. After conducting objective tests on plaintiff, the doctors found, as indicated by their sworn reports, that plaintiff had no orthopedic impairment and no neurologic injury. The orthopedist found that plaintiff may perform the daily activities of living, without restriction, and the neurologist found no permanency or disability as a result of the subject accident. Based upon these findings, a doctor said that defendant argues that plaintiff has not satisfied the “serious injury” threshold, as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). Defendant contends that plaintiff’s alleged soft tissue spinal injuries do not constitute a serious injury.

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This is a case where the court ruled that the motion by plaintiff for summary judgment on the issue of liability or fault but not as to serious injury is granted. However, the cross motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to sustain a “serious injury” within the meaning of Ins. Law §5102 is denied.

This is an action arising out of a hit in the rear car accident that occurred on May 15, 2003, on Glen Cove Road at or near Pound Hollow Road, Nassau County. Plaintiff was struck in the rear by defendant’s vehicle while stopped for a red traffic light. There is no claim that plaintiff had made any short or sudden stop or turn. Plaintiff’s examination before trial testimony states that plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped for a red traffic light. As the light turned to green but before he began his forward motion, plaintiff’s vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by the individual defendant and owned by the corporate defendants. Defendant testified that at the time of the car accident, plaintiffs vehicle was stopped, his view was unobstructed and there was nothing that prevented him from coming to stop before hitting plaintiffs vehicle. Although defendant posits that plaintiff testified that the traffic light had turned to green as the impact occurred, it is clear that his foot was still on the brake and that he had not begun to move.

According to the Suffolk court, there is no competent evidence to dispute plaintiff’s evidence that defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiffs vehicle in the rear. The submission in support of the motion by plaintiff has established entitlement to judgement thus shifting the burden to defendant to rebut the motion by submitting proof in evidentiary form showing the existence of triable issues of fact. Here the defendant has failed to establish the existence of triable issues of fact on the issue of liability or fault and the Court finds no material fact issues requiring a trial with respect to the issue of fault.

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In this case, the Court ruled that Section 12.0 of Ordinance No. 40 of the Town of Hempstead entitled “Operation of Tow Cars” is valid and constitutional.

The plaintiffs are in the tow car business and are licensed tow car operators in the Town of Hempstead in Nassau. The Plaintiff is seeking to declare certain sections of Ordinance No. 40 of the Town of Hempstead entitled ‘Operation of Tow Cars’ unconstitutional and void and to enjoin any action and enforcement thereunder.

The plaintiffs agreed that there is a necessity for regulation of the tow car industry. They contend, however, that section 12.0 is prohibitory, not regulatory, and therefore unconstitutional.

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This case was brought about by a car accident involving a Pontiac automobile which crashed into the living room of the house of the plaintiff-decedent after being pursued by members of the Suffolk County Police Department. The vehicle was owned by defendant-corporation, which rented the car to defendant-lessee, who alleged that defendant-perpetrator took possession of the subject vehicle without her knowledge or consent.

Defendant-corporation sought the dismissal of the complaint and alleged that it is the owner of the subject vehicle, as well as a company in the business of renting automobiles and is therefore insulated from liability by operation of the “Graves Amendment” as codified at 42 USCA §30106 and which is a part of the Federal Transportation Equity Act. Hence, all claims asserted against defendant-corporation must be dismissed as a matter of law.

Defendant-corporation’s Senior Loss Control Administrator stated that in December of 2006, it was the owner of the 2006 Pontiac automobile bearing the license plate CWJ197. He further states that on December 20, 2006, said vehicle was rented to defendant-lessee. The two affidavits authored by defendant-lessee revealed that she was not the owner of the 2006 Pontiac automobile but rather rented same on December 20, 2006 from defendant-corporation and that defendant-perpetrator operated the subject automobile without her knowledge, permission or consent.

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