Articles Posted in Bicycle Accidents

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On March 12 of 2010, a school security guard was struck by the car of one of the parents while attempting to assist her with a traffic issue. He approached her car as she sat in the traffic line to drop off her child. After she pulled in, a school bus pulled in behind her. Her vehicle was blocked. The Westchester security guard approached her vehicle from the front. As he passed in front of her car, she inexplicably drove forward striking the security guard. He incurred a personal injury that resulted in a lawsuit against the woman and her insurance company, but also the owner of the car and their insurance company.

The car was owned by a vehicle leasing company. They had an internal policy against leasing cars to people with revoked or suspended driver’s licenses. Upon investigation, the security guard had discovered that the car had been leased by the woman’s boyfriend who had a restricted driver’s license. The security guard maintains that the company employee violated policy when he leased the car to the man. The man’s driving record clearly indicating that he was not a safe driver as per the standards set by the leasing company itself. The security guard believes that if the leasing company had not leased the car to the man in violation of their own internal policy, he could not have loaned it to his girlfriend, and she would not have hit him with it causing his injury.

The security guard maintains that he was injured so severely as to have to miss several days of work and suffering from injuries so severe that they have altered his lifestyle. He stated that he had a spine injury, head injury, hip and knee injuries that required surgery. He stated that he is no longer able to play ball with his grandchildren or to maintain a normal lifestyle.

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A case against the State of New York was filed by the administrators of Tonya M. Hilliker’s estate. The claim was that two New York State troopers acted with “reckless disregard” in pursuing another vehicle. They allege that Ms. Hilliker of The Bronx died because of that recklessness. The car that they were chasing hit other vehicles. This happened on April 19, 2003 at approximately 2:30 A.M. in the City of Glens Falls.

In the evidence presented, it showed that Trooper Matthew Gilbert of Westchester was being closely followed by a white car. In the vehicle with him was Trooper Kevin Bouyea, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. The white car turned left from Main Street to South Western Avenue. The troopers continued to travel the main street and turned left onto Luzerne Road to see why the other vehicle was following them. A Lawyer mentioned that it was the time that the troopers noticed the white car heading straight toward them. It was going the opposite way on a one-way street. Trooper Gilbert avoided getting hit by pulling the patrol car on the side of the road. The white car passed them. In pursuit of the other vehicle, Trooper Gilbert made a U-turn and activated their emergency lights. The white car did not immediately turn on Broad Street. What the troopers did was to activate their siren. There was no evidence of traffic on Broad Street at the time of pursuit.

While on Broad Street, the speed of the white car was at 80-85 miles per hour, and the troopers were at 70 miles per hour when they were trying to get the plate numbers. They said that they slowed to about 50 miles per hour after getting the license plate as they were concerned about the safety if they continued that kind of chase. They lost sight of the vehicle for a few seconds after it turned at South Street. When they saw it again it was going into a bouncing stop. They exited their vehicle with guns drawn, said a Lawyer. At the scene Timothy Culligan said he was talking to Ms. Hilliker and Walter LaBarge. He was inside his car while the two were standing outside. This was when his car was struck by the white car. In the reconstruct, it was determined that the white vehicle was driving at least 82 miles per hour. For all the witnesses, they said that after the crash the police officers were immediately there about 10 feet away from the white car. This is contrary to the evidence of the lack of contact from the trooper’s vehicle, and that lack of skid marks made by the trooper’s car. Although, when the statement of Trooper Gilbert and Trooper Bouyea were compared there was a difference. A reporter got information that, Trooper Bouyea said he saw the white car hit other vehicles, which meant that they would have been near enough. There is also the undeniable knowledge of both troopers knew at that time, there are a lot of people in that area.

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This action stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of a car accidentwith defendant which occurred on May 30, 2008, at approximately 7:35 a.m., at or near the intersection of Old Country Road and Sweet Hollow Road, Huntington, County of Suffolk, State of New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2005 Mitsubishi truck operated by plaintiff and owned by his employer,and a 2006 Chevrolet owned and operated by defendant.

Plaintiff contends that his vehicle was stopped for a red traffic signal at the aforementioned intersection and, when said traffic signal turned green for vehicles traveling eastbound through the intersection, plaintiff proceeded through said intersection. As plaintiff was driving through the intersection, defendant went through a red traffic light at the intersection and his vehicle collided with plaintiffs vehicle. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that he sustained serious injury.

Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and Article 51 of the Insurance Law of the State of New York, for an order granting him summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury” in the subject accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d). Plaintiff opposes the motion.

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When a vehicle has been involved in a traffic accident, it is not uncommon for issues relative to the ownership of the vehicle to play a part in the venue of the hearing. Venue is the location in which the court will conduct any hearings relative to the case at hand. In order for the court to determine an appropriate venue for a case, it generally takes several items into consideration. Most of the time, such as in criminal trials, the venue for the case is the location where the incident occurred. If a robbery happens in Brooklyn, New York, then the Superior Court of Kings County and not the Superior Court of Queens County will hear the case. However, in civil cases and Family Court, the rules about Venue are much more flexible. Rather than being relative to a particular incident location, it is generally based on the county of domicile for one or both of the participants. If the case involves a business, it is much more likely that the case will be tried in the court that is located in the county where the business maintains its main base of operations.

On October 1, 1982, a traffic accident occurred in the Village of Freeport in Nassau County. The passenger in one of the vehicles, filed a personal injury lawsuit. She named the business that the other driver worked for in her lawsuit. The truck that the man was driving was owned by a business that had their primary offices in Kings County. The business had leased the truck from a truck leasing company that operated out of Nassau County. While the case was waiting for trial, the headquarters of the company moved from Kings County to Nassau County.

Originally, the venue for the car accident case was set for Kings County where the business headquarters was located. Following the move of the business from Kings County to Nassau County, the owner filed a motion to change the venue of the case from Kings County to Nassau County. Originally, the court denied the motion. The owner of the business filed an appeal of the decision.

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A Westchester taxi company filed a request to grant them a decision without trial in dismissing the complaint against them on the ground that the complainant man failed to support a serious injury allegation. However, the complainant man filed a cross motion and for sanctions based upon the court’s prior ruling awarding him a decision without trial regarding the liability.

The action stemmed from the complaint of personal injury action filed by the man against the driver of the taxi, the taxi company and the owner of the taxi. The man alleged that he was stopped at the traffic light when the taxi hit into his vehicle. The driver of the taxi escaped and throughout the proceeding the driver’s location cannot be identified that’s why the taxi company was held vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence.

The taxi company argues that the man has failed to meet the legal requirements of a serious injury under the insurance law. Based on records, serious injury is defined as a personal injury which results in death, dismemberment, significant disfigurement, a fracture, loss of a fetus, permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system, permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ, significant limitation of use of a body function or system, a medically determined impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the impairment.

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This action is for personal injuries alleged to have occurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving vehicles driven by plaintiff, , and defendant, , on February 19, 2002, at the intersection of Deepdale Drive and New York Avenue, Town of Huntington, New York. A Personal Injury Lawyer said that, plaintiff served a summons and complaint on defendant. Thereafter, defendant served a third-party summons and complaint on third-party defendant. Within the third-party complaint, defendant alleged that the traffic light at the subject intersection was malfunctioning and inoperable at the time of the accident.

A Lawyer said that, by order dated April 1, 2005, the third-party defendant was granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against it. Within the aforementioned Order, the Court noted that during the discovery process, it was revealed that the town, not the County of Suffolk, “owned operated and controlled” the traffic signal at the subject intersection. A Suffolk Personal Injury Lawyer said that, by Order dated March 23, 2007, this Court granted the summary judgment motions of second third-party defendant, and third-party defendant, on the grounds that there was no issue of material fact regarding the liability of those defendants. Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff has not met the serious injury threshold as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant has submitted, among other things, the deposition transcript of plaintiff, and reports from two doctors who conducted independent medical examinations of plaintiff.

A source said that, plaintiff served a verified bill of particulars, sworn to on December 11, 2003, which alleged that she suffered the following injuries as a result of the car accident: sprain and contusion of left hip; pain in left hip; pain in left wrist; and injuries to the cervical spine, including spinal nerve root compression and bulging discs. Each injury, except for superficial ones, was alleged to be permanent and/or long lasting, and caused diminution of use and motion of the neck and back. Plaintiff appeared for a deposition, and was thereafter physically examined, on or about October 25, 2006, by an orthopedist, and a neurologist, both of whom were designated by defendant. After conducting objective tests on plaintiff, the doctors found, as indicated by their sworn reports, that plaintiff had no orthopedic impairment and no neurologic injury. The orthopedist found that plaintiff may perform the daily activities of living, without restriction, and the neurologist found no permanency or disability as a result of the subject accident. Based upon these findings, a doctor said that defendant argues that plaintiff has not satisfied the “serious injury” threshold, as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). Defendant contends that plaintiff’s alleged soft tissue spinal injuries do not constitute a serious injury.

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On March 16, 2003, two cars were involved in a head-on collisionin an expressway in Brooklyn, New York. Both the drivers of the two cars claimed damages for serious spinal injuries they allegedly sustained. Both claim that they lost the function of their lumbar or cervical spine. Both claimed bulging discs at the cervical spine, herniated discs at the lumbar spine, sprain and nerve damage. The drivers sued each other as well as their insurers for damages.

Both submitted magnetic resonance imaging scans which their medical experts used as basis to find that there were degenerative changes in the cervical and lumbar spine which show herniation (swelling).

However, the medical reports issued by the examining neurologist at the time of the accident only found the two drivers to be suffering from cervical and thoracic spinal sprain and right shoulder sprain. In the weeks that followed the accident, the same attending neurologist made follow-up reports of the development of the injuries sustained by both the drivers and reported that the spinal sprains have resolved themselves. Even the sprain in the right shoulder and right arm were also resolved. This is evidence, according to the insurers, that neither driver sustained serious injury such that they can be compensated under the Insurance Law. There is no evidence that links their injuries as caused by accident.

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On July 23, 2007, a man was sitting at the traffic control light located at Greenwich Street and Jerusalem Avenue in Nassau County, New York when another vehicle hit his. The other vehicle made contact with his vehicle in a same direction side swipe manner. As the vehicle was driving past his in the same direction, it swerved and the offending vehicle swept up the passenger side of the man’s car from the rear passenger side area to the front. The man filed a personal injury and 90/180 case against the driver of the other vehicle.

In order for a person to claim a serious person injury under the auspices of the New York Insurance Law, they must be able to prove that they suffered an injury that was invasive enough to alter their normal everyday lifestyle. In order to make that statement, the injured person must be able to demonstrate through medical records that they have sustained either a permanent loss of use, or partial percentage loss of use of a member of their body.

Alternatively, they can show a brain injury or spinal injury that is severe enough to have altered their lives and receives treatment. They may also file a 90/180 claim that contends that although they recovered from their injuries, they were incapacitated by them for 90 out of the 180 days that immediately followed the car accident. It is important that the injured person is able to demonstrate that they have been continually under the care of a doctor from the time of the accident until the time that they filed their suit. The court has been known to dismiss a gap in treatment for legitimate reasons if it can be properly documented.

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This involves a case where the court denied the motion of the defendants for summary judgment to dismiss the case against them.

Plaintiff alleged that, on June 16, 2007, he was injured when a New York City Transit Authority Bus driven by its employee made contact with a motor vehicle driven by defendant driver and owned by owner. Plaintiff was a passenger in defendant driver’s vehicle. By decision and order dated September 16, 2008, the court granted defendant owner’s motion to dismiss the complaint and any cross claims in this action as against it. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex E.)

The bill of particulars alleges that, as a result of this alleged car accident, plaintiff sustained herniated discs at C4-C7, and L5-S1, and injuries to his right hip, right arm, right shoulder, neck and back, some of which are believed or may be permanent in nature. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex C [Bill of Particulars ¶ 6].) In August 2008, plaintiff, who was represented by a law firm, apparently decided to represent himself. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex D.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, at the time of the accident, he was employed by Gotham Registry, a nursing agency, working per diem as a licensed nursing assistant.

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On August 24, 2002 nonparty driver was driving a van with eight passengers, one of whom was an adult and seven of whom were children. While driving on a divided highway in Pennsylvania, the driver lost control of the van when the right rear tire blew out. During the resulting crash, the van barrel-rolled across the median and became airborne before landing in the lanes of oncoming traffic. All of the children were ejected from the van and sustained varying degrees of injury. The adult passenger, who remained in the vehicle, died. The appellant lawyer was retained to litigate an action on behalf of the estate and the husband of the deceased, and on behalf of these five infant passengers.

Appellant based her action upon conclusion that the tire at issue had been improperly repaired and was not the proper size for the van. Second, she concluded that the van had a faulty liftgate latch, which allowed the liftgate to open during the car accident. Consequently, she named the manufacturer of the van as a defendant.

Appellant lawyer requested an award of an attorney’s fee in a sum consistent with her retainer agreement, representing one third of the net settlement from the manufacturer of the van and 25% of the net settlement from the driver’s insurer. The Supreme Court approved so much of the proposed infant’s compromise order as concerned the amounts recovered by the infant plaintiffs, but awarded appellant lawyer an attorney’s fee in a sum representing approximately 25% of the aggregate net settlement. The lawyer appealed.

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