Articles Posted in Manhattan

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As described in the Appellate Court’s prior opinion, the complainant woman had two industrial accidents while she was working for the Paint Company before she was involved in an automobile accident that had nothing to do with work. Originally, the judge of compensation claims denied all benefits on the theory that the third (non-compensable) accident was the major contributing cause of her injuries and disability. The Manhattan Appellate Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claimant is entitled to any medical or compensation benefits attributable to either or both of the work-related accidents.

On remand, a successor judge of compensation claims found that the woman’s head injury and jaw condition were causally related solely to the first industrial accident, that her cervical and thoracic spinal injuries were related to all three accidents, and that her lumbar spinal condition was wholly unrelated to the first accident, but attributable equally to the second and third accidents. On the basis of competent, substantial evidence, the judge of compensation claims attributed two-thirds of the woman’s need for treatment of her cervical spine, thoracic spine, and psychiatric problems to the industrial accidents.

The Staten Island employer of a claimant who suffers an industrial injury must furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require. Medical care is properly awarded when the need for such care arises from the combined effect of industrial and nonindustrial conditions. As indicated, the employer is responsible for treatment required by the non-compensable injury if such treatment would not presently be required but for the existence of the compensable injury. The Appellate Court thus approves the approach the judge of compensation claims took on the medical benefits questions, and most of the results he reached.

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On 12 August 2003, a Staten Island woman, who was insured by a certain insurance company, was involved in a motor vehicle accident. She was driving her van when she made a left turn directly into the path of a motorcycle operated by a certain man. The impact caused the operator of the motorcycle (the victim) to be ejected and landed about nineteen feet away. Thereafter, the Manhattan police and paramedics arrived and the victim was taken to the hospital, and it was determined that he sustained serious injuries. The victim stayed in the hospital for thirteen days, and was later transferred to a nursing home.

After the said incident had occurred, the aforesaid woman immediately reported the car accident to her insurance company. In response, the insurance company assigned someone to handle the claim (the agent), who spoke generally about the accident with the said woman (the insured woman); ascertained that neither the insured nor her daughter, who was in the van with the woman at the time of the accident, was injured; advised her that she had $10,000 coverage limits, that is, $10,000 in property damage coverage and $10,000 in bodily injury coverage; and concluded that the insured was probably at fault in causing the accident. After that, the agent assigned attempted to call the victim, who was still in the hospital, but was unable to reach him. The agent then ordered an appraisal of the victim’s motorcycle and assigned that portion of the damage claim to the insurance company’s claim service center in Virginia.

On 18 August 2003, the insurance agent received a call from an attorney (lawyer-one), who indicated that he was representing the victim. However, ten days later, lawyer-one notified the agent that he was no longer representing the victim and provided him with a notice of his attorney’s lien.

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This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident on June 24, 2006 at approximately 8:45 a.m. The accident occurred at Hill Avenue at its intersection with Hempstead Turnpike, Hempstead, New York. Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped at a red light when the vehicle owned and operated by defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. The police accident report states that “motor vehicle #1 in collision with motor vehicle #2.”

In his bill of particulars, a source said that plaintiff alleges that he sustained the following injuries: subligamentous central posterior disc herniation at C4-5, subligamentous central posterior disc hernation at C5-6, impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal posterior lumbar herniation at L4-5, and straightening of the lumbar curvature.

A Lawyer said that, defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant relies uponplaintiff’s deposition testimony and an affirmed medical report of the doctor. At his examination-before-trial, plaintiff testified to his inability to perform activities due to his injuries sustained in the accident. Specifically, The Bronx plaintiff was physically restricted and not able to swim, mountain bike and exercise.

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An automobile accident occurred and, as a result, the appellee suffered serious injuries. He was taken to a Medical Center where he was evaluated by several NYC physicians, including a surgeon, an orthopedist, and a radiologist. However, these physicians misinterpreted appellee’s x-rays and radiological studies, and negligently concluded that he did not suffer a recent spinal injury, specifically a spinal column injury. Consequently, the attending surgeon and assistant encouraged appellee to attempt to walk approximately a week after the automobile accident. When he arose from the bed, appellee felt a shock and collapsed. He was then transferred to another Medical Center, a Regional Medical Center (second Medical Center), where he underwent surgery on his spine, but the surgery was not successful in reversing the spinal column damage, the spinal injury. The appellee then retained a lawyer of a certain law firm to investigate and initiate a legal malpractice action against the various physicians. The lawyer considered joining the physicians individually in the malpractice suit but, for various reasons, he decided not to join. He sent an “intent to sue” only to the two Manhattan Medical Centers and its physicians. However, when the complaint was filed, the first Medical Center was not named. Thereafter, during discovery, the lawyer realized that the second Medical Center’s defense was based upon the comparative fault of the first Medical Center and its physicians. At this point, the statute of limitations had already expired, and the lawyer realized the potential of a legal malpractice claim for failing to join them. Thus, the lawyer then contacted his insurance company and referred the appellee to a new counsel.

The appellee and the second Medical Center, and its physicians, entered into a settlement agreement in the amount of $1,000,000, and then brought a legal malpractice action against the lawyer and his firm, which the Insurance Company agreed to settle for the policy limits. However, the parties disputed whether the “per claim” amount applied or whether the “aggregate” amount applied. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the attorney’s failure to name the first Medical Center and each individual physician constituted independent wrongful acts or a single claim. So, the appellee filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the issue. He claimed that the policy provided $250,000 per wrongful act with a $500,000 aggregate for multiple wrongful acts. Because the lawyer committed multiple wrongful acts, the appellee claimed that he was entitled to the aggregate limits. The Insurance Company argued that the policy was a claims-made policy and that the policy provided $250,000 per claim rather than per wrongful act; that, since there was only one claim, the appellee was entitled to only $250,000 in coverage. The trial court agreed with the appellee and, on motion for summary judgment, entered a judgment in favor of the appellee for the aggregate limits. Based upon its interpretation of the policy, the trial court found that there were several acts of malpractice during the legal representation of appellees. Thus, the trial ruled that the appellees were entitled to the aggregate policy limits. The Insurance Company now appeals the said judgment.

The issues for the court’s determination is whether or not, pursuant to the insurance policy of the law firm the aggregate policy limit should apply where the appellee’s attorney committed multiple wrongful acts by failing to join several defendants in his medical malpractice action; whether or not, because each of the defendants had separate insurance coverage available to pay a damage award, appellee had multiple claims against his attorney.

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A Manhattan man suffered serious as the result of an automobile accident. He was taken to a Hospital where he was evaluated by several physicians, including a surgeon, an orthopedist, and a radiologist. These physicians misinterpreted the man’s x-rays and radiological studies and negligently concluded that he did not suffer a recent spinal injury.

As a result, the attending Westchester surgeon and assistant encouraged him man to attempt to walk approximately a week after the accident. When he arose from the bed, he felt a shock and collapsed. He was transferred to a Medical Center where he underwent surgery on his spine. However, the surgery was unsuccessful in reversing the spinal column damage.

The man retained a law firm to investigate and initiate a medical malpractice action against the various physicians. Although the man’s counsel considered joining the Hospital physicians individually in the medical malpractice suit, for various reasons he decided not to join them and sent intent to sue only to the Hospital and Medical Center Regional and its physicians. When the complaint was filed, however, the Hospital was not named. During discovery, the man’s counsel realized that the Medical Center Regional’s defense was based upon the comparative fault of the Hospital and its physicians. At this point, the statute of limitations had expired, and the counsel realized the potential of a legal medical malpractice claim for failing to join them. The counsel contacted his insurance company. He also referred the man to a new counsel. The man settled with the Medical Center Regional and its physicians for $1,000,000, and then brought a legal medical malpractice action against his counsel and his firm, which the man’s insurance company agreed to settle for the policy limits. However, the parties disputed whether the “per claim” amount applied or whether the aggregate amount applied. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the attorney’s failure to name the Hospital and each individual physician constituted independent wrongful acts or a single claim.

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This involves a case where the court denied the motion of the defendants for summary judgment to dismiss the case against them.

Plaintiff alleged that, on June 16, 2007, he was injured when a New York City Transit Authority Bus driven by its employee made contact with a motor vehicle driven by defendant driver and owned by owner. Plaintiff was a passenger in defendant driver’s vehicle. By decision and order dated September 16, 2008, the court granted defendant owner’s motion to dismiss the complaint and any cross claims in this action as against it. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex E.)

The bill of particulars alleges that, as a result of this alleged car accident, plaintiff sustained herniated discs at C4-C7, and L5-S1, and injuries to his right hip, right arm, right shoulder, neck and back, some of which are believed or may be permanent in nature. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex C [Bill of Particulars ¶ 6].) In August 2008, plaintiff, who was represented by a law firm, apparently decided to represent himself. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex D.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, at the time of the accident, he was employed by Gotham Registry, a nursing agency, working per diem as a licensed nursing assistant.

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Sometimes, people assume that attorneys do not need to hire attorneys. However, the truth is that attorneys in Manhattan understand that only a fool will defend themselves. Hiring an attorney to represent a person who has incurred a personal injury is the smart thing to do. Lawyers are people, too. That means that there are times when a lawyer will hire a lawyer to help them defend themselves from a situation. These situations can come in the form of automobile accidents, estate matters, real estate matters, or personal injury. There are even times when an attorney is required to hire another attorney to defend them against a criminal matter.

Recently, in 2012, a prominent attorney was called upon to defend himself from charges of DUI that stemmed from his driving in the city of Atlanta. He slid through a traffic light at three in the morning when he thought that no one was around on his way home from a meeting with state legislatures where he had consumed two glasses of wine with dinner. Although, his driving had not endangered anyone, and he had not demonstrated any level of impairment by failing to maintain his lane of traffic, the officer who stopped him asked that he perform field sobriety tests. Field sobriety tests are voluntary. However, if you choose to perform them, your demeanor and the results of the tests can be used against you in a court of law. The attorney decided that he would not participate. He refused to participate and he was arrested by the officer for DUI and taken for a mandatory test under the laws of the state. The charges were eventually dropped with the help of a DUI attorney that was hired by the arrested attorney to defend him. Even attorneys need one every now and then.

Another case in Staten Island that involved an attorney who required legal assistance from a specialist in the field, involved a case of defamation and breach of contract that was filed by an attorney in the State of New York in 2006. The complainant attorney was not getting along with the other attorneys in her firm and decided to resign. When she left the firm, several of the clients that she had been serving chose to leave that firm and maintain her as their lawyer. The controlling partner of the law firm wrote several letters to these clients encouraging them to leave her and return to his firm. The complaining lawyer, filed a lawsuit alleging that the managing partner of her previous firm had defamed her character and breached the hiring contract that she had with him. The managing partner filed a motion with the New York State Court System to grant him a motion of summary judgment dismissing her case against him for lack of evidence.

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A father died as a result of a vehicular accident. His surviving spouse and their two children filed a case for wrongful death against the owners of the vehicle that collided with the father’s car. After the litigation, the owners of the vehicle paid a sum of $182, 717.00 in damages.

By the time that the wrongful death suit was terminated, the surviving spouse had also died. The owners of the vehicles then filed this action to ask the court to determine who should receive the judgment award, and what the sharing should be among those who should receive the judgment award. The Long Island owners of the car that collided with the deceased’s car came to court to ask for a final determination as to the sharing of the heirs and surviving relative of the deceased in the proceeds of the wrongful death action.

The estate of the surviving spouse claims that it should receive half of the proceeds from the wrongful death suit as she is entitled to share in her deceased husband’s estate. The two surviving children of the deceased father asked for the disqualification of the surviving spouse’s estate and that the proceeds should instead be shared by them, the two children of the deceased.

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This case is about a defendant-corporation seeking the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) by reason of the Graves Amendment; and the plaintiff seeking leave of court to amend the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) in order to avoid dismissal on that ground.

Plaintiff alleged that on April 29, 2006, she sustained serious personal injuries as a result of a collision between her vehicle and a vehicle owned by defendant-corporation and operated by defendant-driver. She further alleged that defendant-driver was an employee of defendant-corporation, and was operating the vehicle “under the course of his employment,” and “with the express knowledge, consent and/or on the business” of defendant-corporation. The collision was allegedly caused by “the defendants’ negligence, carelessness and recklessness”.

A Federal statue, known as the Graves Amendment “bars vicarious liability actions against professional lessors and renters of vehicles,” as would otherwise be permitted by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. “Vicarious liability laws caused lessors to either cease leasing cars in states having them, opting for more expensive balloon note structures, or spread the cost of higher insurance premiums to lease customers nationwide.”

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A man drove to the house of a friend whom he was supposed to pick up. When he got to his friend’s house, he left the car engine running with the key in the ignition to ring the doorbell and alert his friend that he had already arrived to pick him up. While he was in the house, a man stole the car that was parked in the driveway. The thief took the car and drove off at such a high speed.

In the meantime another man was stopped at an intersection. He was waiting for the light to turn green so that he can make a left turn. As he was waiting for the traffic signal, the thief was driving from the same direction at such a high speed. The thief lost control of the He car and hit the car that was stopped at the intersection.

The impact of the stolen car hitting the stopped car was so great that the driver of the parked car lost consciousness while still inside his car. When the parked car was struck from behind by the stolen car, the parked car also careened off and hit another car.

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